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Abstract 
93 
This paper presents a model that calculates the social welfare benefits of using 
additional subsidy to reduce fare levels or improve service levels of public transit in 
Chicago. The model differentiates between the effects in peak and off-peak periods for 
both bus and rapid rail service. Results of the analysis are that bus fares should be re-
duced during the off-peak; rail fares are broadly acceptable; bus service levels are broadly 
acceptable, except for the peak period where they are too high; and rail serv~ce levels are 
too high at all times of the week, but especially in the peaks and on Sundays. In general, 
it is more advantageous to use subsidy monies to reduce fares than improve service lev-
els. Even if overall subsidy levels were not increased, society would be better off if ser-
vice levels were reduced, and the money saved channeled into reductions in fares. 
Introduction 
The Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) provides comprehensive bus and 
rapid rail service in the city of Chicago, with a peak vehicle requirement of 1,700 
motor buses and 800 railcars. Currently, all of the capital costs and 50 percent of 
the operating costs are funded by public subsidies. Operating subsidies are pri-
marily raised from a local sales tax levy. Federal operating support is less than 5 
percent of costs. This paper investigates CTA operations in 1994 to see whether 
this level of subsidy can be justified. 
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Economic Theory 
Passengers face a gene:rp.lized cost of riding transit which is composed of 
\... 
the fare that they pay (P) and tlie time costs associated with waiting at stops and 
riding on the vehicle. Each user faces a generalized cost (GT) of: 
GT= P + w(M) + t(M, QT) (1) 
where M is the nu~ber of vehicle miles operated, and QT the nm~ber of transit 
riders. The w(M) function represents the monetary equivalent of the time taken 
waiting at stops. As the level of service increases, average waiting times at stops 
should fall. The t(M, QT) function is the monetary equivalent of the time taken on 
the vehicle ("in-transit time"). This will vary with the average number of people 
on the vehicle. As the vehicle gets more crowded, it will have to stop more often 
and for longer periods for people to board and alight. This function will be in-
creasing in QT but decreasing in M. The transit agency will face a demand function: 
QT =d(GT) (2) 
The transit agency's costs (C) can be thought of as a combination of fixed 
costs (F) and the marginal cost (a) of providing each vehicle mile: 
C=F+aM (3) 
The transit agency can choose the levels of P and M, and the market will 
determine GT and QT' If the transit agency was a social welfare maximizing mo-
nopolist without any budget constraint, welfare would be maximized when: 
00 
max W= J d(G1)oGT + PQ7 - F - aM 
gt( ,M) 
This gives the following first order conditions: 
(4) 
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ow= -d(G1)oGT + Q + PoQr = 0 
oP oP r oP (5) 
oW = -d(G1) oGT + poQT _: a = O 
oM oM oM (6) 
These equations can be simplified by removing the partial derivatives of Q 
and GT with respect to P and M. This can be done by differentiating equations 
(I) and (2) with respect to P and Mand then solving using Cramer's Rule. This 
will result in the simplified first order conditions: 
P = Q ot(.) 
1 0QT 
ow(.) ot(.) ow(.) ot(.) 
__ +__ __+ __ 
a = Q oM oM _ p&J(.) oM oM 
&1(.) ot(.) _ 1 oGT &1(.) ot(.) _ 1 
oGT oQr oGT oQr 
(7) 
(8) 
The first condition is that fare should be set equal to the delay caused to all 
existing riders due to the boarding and alighting of the marginal rider. The sec-
ond condition is that the operating cost of a marginal vehicle mile should be set 
equal to the benefit to riders of the marginal vehicle mile on their waiting and in-
transit time, less the revenue gained from the new passengers attracted to the 
improved service. The latter condition also recognizes that while additional ser-
vice will generally lower generalized cost, there is a countervailing effect in that 
the additional passenger trips generated may slow service because of their boarding 
and alighting time. 
There are three implications that are important o this work. The first is that 
fares and service levels are both policy variables{?r the transit agency, so any 
additional subsidy can be used to either reduce fares or augment service levels. 
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The second is that passengers impose externalities on each other. On one hand, 
additional passengers increaseJhe travel ti~es of existing riders becau~e of addi-
tional time spent at stops. On th~ other hand, any exogenous increases in demand 
will result in the provision of additional service, and this will generate more 
ridership because generalized cost will fall as waiting times and the number of 
people on each vehicle falls. This latter economy of scale in the number of pas-
sengers on user costs is commonly referred to as the "Mohring (1972) effect." 
The third implication is that the first order conditions define an "optimal" mix of 
fares and service levels, which will be referr~d to in this paper as the_ point at 
which-fares and service levels are "balanced." 
Driving is a substitute for transit. The demand for driving (QA), measured in 
vehicle miles, will be determined by the attractiveness of public transportation 
(P and M) and positively related to the average speed that traffic moves on the 
roads (S). If congestion leads to the lower average speeds, then roads become 
less attractive to potential users: 
QA= a(P, M, S) (9) 
The cost of road travel to each user ( GA) comprises the taxation payment to 
support the cost of building and maintaining the roads (R), the private operating 
costs of vehicles (0), and user time costs, which will be an inverse function ofS, 
which is itself a function of the total number of people wishing to use the highway: 
(10) 
For welfare maximization, the first order condition would require that a 
"congestion toll" be charged equal to the time penalty imposed by the marginal 
user on all of the existing users who now have to travel slower because the road 
is more congested. However, congestion pricing of roads is not used in Chicago, 
and is not likely to be in the foreseeable future. A second best alternative is to use 
subsidies to make transit more attractive and thereby encourage some road users 
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to switch modes. This 
will reduce road con-
gestion and improve 
travel times for. those 
people who continue to 
use the roads. 
Figure 1 shows 
the market for road 
travel. The average 
user cost curve (GA) is 
flat at low levels of de-
mand because addi-
tional vehicles do not 
impede existing traffic. 
However, beyond a Figure 1. Market for road travel. 
certain point, conges-
tion develops and travel times start to increase. If transit were priced commer-
cially, there would be a demand curve D0 for road travel, and in equilibrium QAo 
miles are driven. If transit is subsidized, the demand curve moves inward to D 1, 
and QA2 vehicle miles are driven. The QA1 users who co_ntinue to drive each gain 
(GA0-GAJ because the road is less congested. In addition QA1QA2 miles are gen-
erated because the roads are more attractive. The additional surplus that is gen-
erated in the road sector from transit subsidies would justify lower fares and 
greater service levels than would be suggested from the model in equations ( 4 )-
(8). Glaister and Lewis (1977) estimated such a model for London. 
The provision of subsidy funds is not without cost. In the case of Chicago, 
additional transit subsidies are provided by a sales tax levy. Raising tax rates will 
increase the cost of goods and services and produce a deadweight loss 0 for 
every dollar of subsidy monies raised. According to Jorgenson and Yun (1991), 
the marginal excess cost per dollar of tax reven~~nerated from a sales tax is 
26.2 cents. This "shadow value ( or excess burden) of public funds" should not be 
confused with the costs of solely administering raising tax dollars. 
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Optimal transit subsidies, fares, and service levels would, therefore, be based 
on a modified version of eq~#on ( 4 ), which includes both the benefits of re-
duced road congestion and the 6xcess burden of transit subsidies, which would 
be, in its most simplistic version, given by the term: 
- 0 (F + aM = PQr) 
Dodgson and Topham (1987a) provide a more sophisticated version of this 
model, allowing for income distribution issues. to be considered. 
Previous Literature 
In Britain in the early 1980s, there was considerable concern by the national 
government hat socialist-leaning local authorities in the major cities were pro-
viding "too much" subsidy to the local publicly-owned bus companies. The Brit-
ish Transport Act of 1983 required local authorities to measure the benefits of 
subsidy as part of their planning process. The national Department of Transport 
sponsored the development of a computer model, the Method for Evaluating 
Transport Subsidies (METS), which is reported in Glaister (1987). This model 
contained a set of simultaneous equations expressing the demand for public trans-
portation and road transportation, the congestion conditions of the roads, and the 
user costs for both transit and driving. Later, another British transport economist, 
John Dodgson (1987), estimated a more stripped-down version of the model for 
the major cities in Australia. 
The results of Glaister's and Dodgson's work are reported in Table 1. The 
second and third columns report the benefit-cost ratios of a marginal pound or 
dollar of subsidy spent on reducing fares or improving service levels. The cost is 
simply the nominal amount of subsidy and does not include any shadow value of 
raising the public funds. In nearly all cases, the benefits of subsidizing fares ex-
ceed those of subsidizing expanded service levels. This indicates that none of the 
systems are near the "balance" described in the previous section. Social welfare 
could be improved considerably, even if overall subsidy levels are kept constant, 
by reducing service levels and using the money saved to reduce fares. Glaister's 
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British work calculates the changes in fare and service levels necessary to bring 
them into balance. These are shown in the fourth and fifth columns. In general, 
service levels should be reduced by 15 percent and the savings used to reduce 
fares by 20 percent. When fares and service levels have been balanced, one can 
investigate whether additional subsidies are justified. These benefit-cost ratios 
Table 1 
Results of Previous Literature in the UK and Australia 
City Benefit-Cost Ratio For Changes to Balance Fares Benefit-
(Bus systems and Service Levels Cost Ratio 
unless otherwise Reduced Increased Fares Service Levels at Balance 
-indicated) Point 
. Fares Service Levels 
Birmingham 1.21. 1.41 +5% +4% 1.24 
Leeds 1.29 0.81 -24% -13% 1.18 
Manchester 1.33 0.71 -23% -17% 1.19 
Liverpool 1.31 1.15 -6% -3% 1.26 
Sheffield 1.03 1.03 0 0 1.03 
London- bus 2.12 0.37 -28% -31 % 
London -subway 1.26 1.79 -11% +19% 
1.28 
Sydney 0.37 
Newcastle 0.46 
Melbourne 0.32 
Brisbane 0.53 
Adelaide 1.43 ·o.43 
Perth 0.47 
Hobart 0.48 
Canberra - 0.48 
Sydney - Rail 1.25 0.39 
Melbourne - rail 1.25 0.27 
Brisbane - rail 1.33 0.53 
Adelaide -rail 1.55 0.34 
Perth - rail 1.55 0.26 
·~ .. 
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are shown in the final column and should be compared with the shadow value of 
public funds. Dodgson and TG~ham (1987b) report a shadow value of about 11 
percent for the property tax used to fund transit in Britain. Therefore, additional 
subsidies could be justified in all cities except for Sheffield, a city where the 
price of transit had been held at very low levels. 
A more stunning result is that cost-benefit ratios are less than unity for im-
proving service levels in Leeds, Manchester, London buses, and ail services in 
Australia. This suggests that unambiguously too much service is provided in these 
cities. There would seem to be a natural tendenyy for transit agencies to maintain 
a level of service far in excess of that justified, and, as a result, charge higher 
fares to remain within their budgets. 
Innovations in This Work 
In general, this work follows that of Dodgson, in that a comprehensive in-
teractive demand model is not used. However, Dodgson calculates welfare at the 
margin, whereas we follow Glaister in calculating inframarginal welfare changes. 
Our model, therefore, permits calculation of the balance point of fares and ser-
vice levels. 
The innovation in our work is the introduction of different time periods 
\ within the week. Both Dodgson and Glaister simply calculate an overall daily 
figure. In this work, the week is divided into four time periods: weekday peaks (6 
a.m.-9 a.m., 3 p.m.-6 p.m. ), weekday off-peak, Saturdays, and Sundays. This 
should permit identification of where the imbalance of fares and frequencies is oc-
cumng. 
Details of the Model 
The Transit Demand Model 
The generalized cost (GT) for each rider is: 
GT=P+vT+v W t w (11) 
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where Pis the fare paid, Tis in-transit time, Wis the time taken waiting at the 
stop, and vt and v w are the values of time for in-transit and waiting respectively. 
Demand is taken as a linear function of GT. The relationship between demand 
and GT will be expressed as the elasticity of demand with respect to generalized 
cost of travel (EGT). The literature dqes not generally report empirical values of 
EGT' but there is abundant literature on price elasticities of demand (sp). These 
two elasticities are related to each other in that: 
(12) 
A study was conducted for the CTA in the late 1980s that produced some 
very specific price elasticities for time 
of day and mode (LTI Consultants 
1988). These are shown in the numbers 
on the edges of Table 2. Knowledge of 
the number of riders in each time and 
mode category allowed us to infer the 
elasticities in the middle of the table. 
One will note that the demand for rapid 
transit rail service is very inelastic, even 
Table2 
Price Elasticities 
Bus Rail 
Peak --0.25 --0.12 
Off-Peak --0.50 --0.16 
Total --0.40 --0.14 
Total 
--0.19 
--0.44 
--0.34 
in off-peak periods. In contrast, bus service is less inelastic especially in the off-
peak. Much of the difference is explained by the longer journey lengths on the 
rail service compared with bus service (6 miles compared with 2), and the radial 
nature of the rail system that is oriented to trips to downtown, whereas the bus 
service serves the neighborhoods. Therefore, both walking and the automobile 
are easier substitutes for bus trips than rail trips. 
Information is available from the annual Section 15 report submitted to the 
Federal Transit Administration (CTA 1995) on the average fare paid on the bus 
and rail modes. This is calculated by dividing total revenue by total trips on the 
mode. However, average fare paid is likely to v~~cross different time periods 
because the type of passengers will vary. School children and the elderly pay 
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reduced fares, and commuters with monthly passes and pre-purchased tokens 
pay a discounted fare. Fort~ely, the electronic fareboxes used on the buses 
store such information, thus allowing use of a management report to enable de-
termination the average fare in each time period. We were not able to obtain 
similar information for the rail system since fare collection is not automated. We, 
I . therefore, assumed that the average fare paid on the rail system would vary about 
i 
the weekly mean in the same ratio as on the bus system. However; inter-time-
period differences in average fare are not very large, at most 5¢. 
Information is available in the Section 15 reports to calculate in-transit time 
for each mode and time period. The average journey length is calculated by di-
viding passenger miles by passenger trips. This is then converted into minutes by 
dividing by the average speed of operation, found by dividing vehicle miles by 
vehicle hours. 
The model of bus service is constructed in such a way to allow the in-transit 
time to vary according to average load factor. As fares and service levels are 
changed, the aver.age number of people on each bus will vary, and, hence, in-
transit time will vary because the bus will have to stop more frequently and/or for 
longer periods to allow the extra people to board or alight. The change in average 
travel time is the number of extra people on each bus multiplied by the average 
boarding and alighting time (BAT). For the configuration of vehicle and type of 
fare collection used by the CTA, this is 2 ½ seconds per person (Transportation 
Research Board 1985). The change in in-transit ime can, therefore, be expressed as: 
(13) 
where the O subscript is the status quo and the 1 subscript represents the situation 
after a fare and/or service level change. One will immediately note that the Qn 
on the right hand side of this equation is itself a function of I},. T. Therefore, the 
equation will have to be rationalized to collect all of the terms in I},. T on the left 
hand side. In general, this will produce: 
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(14) 
This equation simplifies considerably when only fares change because ~ 
and ~ W will be zero. The model for rail service does not include this effect 
because the number of stops is predetermined and station dwell time is less sen-
sitive to changes in load factor. 
Waiting time is taken as a function of the headway (H) between bus or train 
arrivals at a stop. Prior research has indicated that for headways of up to 12 
minutes, passenger arrivals at stops are random and W is half of H; for longer 
headways transit users attempt to arrive at stops close to the time of departure, 
and W becomes less than half of H. Our research uses the seminal relationship 
found by Seddon and Day (1974). This quadratic relations relates headway and 
waiting time in seconds: 
W = 11.39 + 0.49H - 0.0000982 (15) 
Information on average headways was obtained from a CTA management 
document that summarized the published schedules for each bus and rail route. 
An average for each time period for each mode was obtained by weighting the 
headway on each route by the vehicle hours operated on that route. 
A standard approach was taken to valuing in-transit and waiting time (Bein 
et al. 1994 ). In-transit time is valued at half of the average wage rate, and waiting 
time at the average wage rate. Bureau of Labor Statistics ( 1996) figures were 
obtained on the average wage rate in Chicago in November 1994, which pro-
duced a value of in-transit time of about 10¢ per minute and a value of waiting 
time of about 20¢ per minute. A summary of the data used for the transit demand 
analysis is shown in Table 3. - ... ,
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Table 3 
Base Data for the ltansit Demand Model 
Bus 
Annual Passenger trips (million) 
Annual Bus Miles (million) 
Average Fare($) 
Average Headway (min) 
Average Trip length (miles) 
Average Trip Time (min) 
¾.\,.. 
,: 
Average Load Factor (passengers/bus) 
Rail 
Annual Passenger trips (million) 
Annual Train Miles (million) 
Average Fare($) 
Average Headway (min) 
Average Trip length (miles) 
Average Trip Time (min) 
Average Load Factor (passengers/train) 
The Transit Cost Model 
Weekdays 
Peak Off-Peak 
136.4 136.4 
23.7 33.8 
0.73 0.75 
6.1 10.9 
2.4 2.3 
14.0 13.4 
13.8 9.3 
Weekdays 
Peak Off-Peak 
74.6 52.0 
2.6 4.8 
0.74 0.75 
5.5 9.2 
6.4 5.5 
16.2 14.0 
181.9 59.5 
Weekends 
Saturday Sunday 
33.8 24.8 
7.9 • 7.1 
0.79 0.79 
10.7 13.1 
2.3 2.2 
13.1 11.8 
9.8 7.5 
Weekends 
Saturday Sunday 
9.8 7.6 
1.1 1.2 
0.80 0.80 
9.0 8.3 
5.5 6.0 
13.3 13.7 
47.6 37.7 
The model assumes that the marginal cost for an additional passenger on a 
predetermined level of service is zero. Therefore, if subsidy is used to change 
fares there will be no change in the CTA's cost of operations to the CTA. How-
ever, if subsidy is used to change service levels, there are cost implications of 
running additional vehicle miles and changing the size of the fleet. Section 15 
financial reports on operating expenses (CTA 1995) and information on capital 
expenditures were used to separate costs into three types: (1) costs that vary with 
vehicle hours operated, (2) costs that vary with the number of vehicles owned, 
and (3) other costs that are taken to be invariant with service. Table 4 indicates 
how the various Section 15 cost categories are classified in our model. 
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Table4 
Cost Allocation System 
Section 15 Cost Vary with Vehicle Hours Vary with Invariant with 
Categories Vehicles Owned Service 
Operating Expenses Operators' wages & fringe Administrative 
benefits, Fuel (buses), & Support Staff 
Electricity (rail), Liability 
Vehicle Maintenance Tires, Lubricants, Oil Labor, Materials Utilities, 
Administration 
.Non-Vehicle Maintenance All 
General Administration All 
Capital Costs Annualized All Other 
Vehicle Purchase Capital Exp~nses 
While Section 15 reports do include information on capital expenditures, it 
is not particularly useful to use data from only one year, in that capital expendi-
tures on buses and rail cars are lumpy expenses. An alternative approach was 
adopted of calculating an annual capital expense if the CTA continually replaced 
its bus fleet on a 12-year cycle and its railcars on a 3 5-year cycle with refurbish-
ment after 25 years. The Regional Transportation Authority provided figures on 
the purchase price of the most recent series of buses ($218,000 each), railcars 
($855,000), and the mid-life railcar refurbishment cost ($400,000). 
Based on these data, the variable cost of running an extra bus hour is $4 7 
and an extra train hour is $210, and the annual cost of vehicle ownership is $67,600 
for a bus and $78,000 for a railcar. Our model assumes that if service levels are 
increased in the off-peak, the CTA bears only the additional variable cost of 
running the extra bus or train hours. However, if service is increased in the peak, 
the CTA be_ars the cost of a proportionate increase in the number of vehicles 
owned in addition to the cost of additional bus or train hours. The peak to midday 
base vehicle requirement ratio for the CTA is 1. 72 for buses and 2.54 for railcars. 
Off-peak service can be expanded considerably without the need for additional 
vehicle ownership. 
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Transit Welfare Calculations 
The demand curve for ti:_ansit service is assumed to be linear, and, therefore, 
\-..., 
any benefits to newly-generateo transit trips can be evaluated in the usual way by 
the "rule of a half." Changes in transit consumer surplus (~CST) will therefore be: 
(16) 
and the change in producer surplus will be the change in total revenue less change 
in total cost. This will, of course, be equal to the total amount of extra subsidy 
that will have to be granted. 
Highway Model 
Of the generated transit travel (QT1 - QT0), some portion will be people who 
switch modes from the automobile, and some portion will be entirely new trips. 
Some people in the former category may have been auto passenger or users of 
van-pools and although they changed mode there will not be a reduction in auto-
mobile traffic. 
Empirical evidence on the proportion of new-to-transit trips that were pre-
viously auto drivers or taxi users can be found from ridership surveys after new 
transit line construction in Chicago: the Blue Line Extension to the northwest 
side (CATS 1986) and the opening of the Orange Line to the southwest side 
(LaBelle and Stuart 1995). The proportion was 20.1 percent and 51. 7 percent, 
respectively. While both extensions serve airports, airport traffic is a relatively 
minor proportion of generated ridership. This analysis will assume that 50 per-
cent of generated transit trips were mode shifters from the automobile. Given a 
knowledge .of average transit trip lengths for both bus and rail, it is possible to 
calculate the number of vehicle miles removed from the roads. 
The 50 percent assumption implies a cross-elasticity in the peak period be-
tween vehicle miles and transit fares of 0.0011 and between vehicle miles and 
transit waiting time of0.009 based on auto travel on congested roads in the whole 
of Cook County, which covers the city of Chicago and most of the inner suburbs. 
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These elasticities are low compared with the fare cross-elasticity of 0.14 calcu-
lated by Webster and Bly (1980) and transit waiting time cross-elasticities in the 
range of 0.02-0.14 estimated by Peat, Marwick (1972). However, one should 
remember that the base number of vehicle miles includes trips for which the 
CTA is not a substitute and the miles of frei~t vehicles. Unlike in Europe, the 
CTA is a marginal player in urban transportation, with a market share of only 21 
percent of work trips made to destinations within the city of Chicago. 
The basic highway model was shown in Figure 1. If transit becomes more 
attractive and the road is congested, the movement inward of the demand curve 
from D0 to D1 will produce increases in welfare to other road users. However, if 
the demand curve intersects the average cost of the travel curve on its flat por-
tion, which is to say that the road is uncongested, then even if automobile users 
switch to transit there will not be a change in the average speed on the road, and 
there will therefore be no additional benefit to the remaining road users. There-
fore, benefits will accrue only 
to the road sector where the 
roads are already congested. 
Our model will assume that 
there is no road congestion in 
the off-peak and on weekends. 
In addition, during the peak 
there will be some roads that 
operate under free-flow condi-
tions. 
Table 5 
Weekday Peak Vehicle Miles 
Road Congestion Level 
Type Free-Flow Moderate Severe 
Freeway 4,550,000 5,050,000 3,350,000 
Arterial 7,500,000 10,600,000 4,950,000 
Collector 450,000 312,000 90,000 
The current demand for peak-period road travel in Cook County, measured 
in vehicle miles, is classified into nine categories, depending on the type of high-
way and the level of congestion. These are shown in Table 5. The data represent 
demand on a typical weekday and are derived from the Chicago Area Transpor-
tation Study's (CATS) regional demand model. The boundaries between the three 
levels of congestion were based on CATS calculatipns of the ratio of traffic vol-
"· 
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ume to theoretical road capacity on each road link. Deriving the information in 
the table was not an easy tast and is described in more detail in the appendix. 
The vehicle miles that are 'removed from the ·highway by the mode switch to 
transit are assumed to come from roads in the moderately and severely congested 
categories. This is because free-flow conditions generally exist in parts of subur-
ban Cook County where the CTA does not provide service. The mileage removed 
from the roads is subtracted from the six categories of road/congestion levels in 
proportion to current demand. 
When subsidies are used to improv~ serv~ce levels, the number of bus miles 
operated increases, which adds to the number of vehicles on the road. These 
additional miles are assumed to occur on moderately and severely congested 
arterials roads and in proportion to current road demand. The increase in vehicle 
miles on these roads is calculated based upon the passenger car equivalent (PCE) 
11 that a bus represents. In Chicago, buses stop in the roadway rather than bus bays, 
and, according the Highway Capacity Manual (Transportation Research Board 
1985), a bus is equivalent to 4.37 cars. 
, I 
~ 
I,• 
Ii 
i ! 
A model, similar to that shown in Figure 1, is estimated for each of the six 
types of moderately and severely congestion roads, with daily peak-period ve-
hicle miles o~ the horizontal axis and generalized cost per mile on the vertical 
axis. The calculation of the original level of demand (QA0) and the amount of 
traffic that switches to transit less any increase in the number of buses operated 
(QA0-QA1) has been described in the previous paragraphs. 
The next step is to derive an algebraic expression for the average user cost 
(GA) curve. While there are standard formulations used by traffic engineers, this 
model calibr_ates a curve based on actual conditions in the Chicago area. The 
calculations were made for two types of roads: freeways and arterial roads. The 
relationship for collector roads was taken to be equivalent to that for the arterial 
roads. Average speeds for both expressways and arterial roads for the downtown 
area, the rest of the city of Chicago, and suburban Cook County are reported in 
CATS (1996). These speeds were taken to be equivalent to severe congestion, 
moderate congestion, and free-flow, respectively. The traffic volume to capacity 
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ratios for severe ("level of service E") and moderate ("level of service C") con-
gestion were obtained from the Highway Capacity Manual for 50 mph designed 
speed freeways and class III arterial roads. 
This gives two data points on volume-to-capacity ratio and average speed 
for each of the road types. A linear estimate was made of the relationship be-
tween these two variables. This relationship allowed calculations to be made of 
the relationship between traffic volume and user cost. The ratio of QA1 to QAo 
vehicle miles directly indicates the change in volume to capacity ratio, and hence 
to the change in speed. There is a direct relationship between changes in speed 
and the change in the time taken to drive one mile. The change in time is valued 
using the work of Bein et al. (1994) who found that people value their time at 65 
percent of the average hourly wage rate on moderately congested roads and 78 
percent of the hourly wage rate on severely congested roads. Therefore, one can 
calculate ( GA0 - GA1 ), if one assumes that vehicle operating costs per mile do not 
change. The latter assumption is not unreasonable, given that, under the most 
extreme changes we look at-those necessary to balance fares and frequencies-
average speeds on freeways change by about 3 mph and those on arterial roads 
change by less than ½ mph. 
Knowledge of QAO' QA, and (GA0 - GA1) permits calculation for the ultimate 
equilibrium (GA2, QA2), providing the slope of the demand curve is known. Chan 
and Ou (1978) find that the elasticity of vehicle miles to travel time is -0.8. The 
ultimate change in consumer welfare for each category of road is: 
(17) 
For the case where transit fares are reduced, each vehicle mile removed 
from the road produces a benefit to other road users of22½¢. This varies from 8¢ 
per mile on a moderately congested freeway to 55¢ per mile on a severely con-
gested arterial road. 
Unfortunately, for the case-where service lev~. are improved, the addition 
of buses on already-congested arterial roads makes road users worse off, not 
better off. This is because load factors on the buses are very low and, therefore, 
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the additional bus occupies more passenger-car units of road space than the number 
of riders it attracts from driviQg. 
'f, 
Results 
Changes in Current Fares and Service Levels 
_Table 6 shows the gross social welfare benefit per dollar of subsidy based 
upon either a IO percent decrease in fare or a IO percent increase in service levels 
for both rail and bus service during 
each of the four periods. The peak 
periods for both bus and rail include 
their respective contributions to the 
welfare changes on the roads. The 
numerator of the benefit-cost ratio 
includes only the changes in con-
sumer surplus. Producer surplus 
change, which is equivalent o the 
subsidy requirement, is the denomi-
nator. 
The baseline comparison for 
each of these figures is 1.262, which 
is the cost of the dollar of subsidy 
Table6 
Results of Benefit-Cost Analysis 
Benefit Weekdays Weekends 
per $1 of 
Peak Off-Peak Saturday Sunday subsidy 
FARES DECREASED BY 10% 
Bus 1.39 1.77 1.77 1.80 
Rail 1.26 1.18 1.18 1.18 
SERVICE LEVELS INCREASED BY 10% 
Bus 0.21 1.11 1.24 1.16 
Rail 0.3:4 0.97 0.77 0.54 
plus the excess burden of raising that dollar. Therefore, one may draw the fol-
lowing conclusions about appropriate uses of subsidy: 
• Bus fares could be reduced, especially during off-peak and weekend pe-
riods. 
• Rail fares are "acceptable" in that the marginal benefit of using subsidy 
to reduce fares is close to the excess burden of raising the subsidy. 
• Bus service levels are broadly acceptable, given the tolerance of the 
model, except for the peak period where they are too high. 
• Rail service levels are too high at all times of the week, but especially in 
the peaks and on Sundays. 
Winter 1997 
Journal of Public Transportation 111 
These conclusions are consistent with the results of Dodgson (1987), indi-
cating that Chicago, and most likely American cities in general, are more like 
Australia with respect to public transit than they are like Britain. 
Bus fares have a high return to subsidy because of the current CTA fares 
policy. The CTA charges a flat fare that is the same on both modes. This is de-
spite the fact that bus journeys are both more elastic and have considerably shorter 
average journey lengths. In addition, people wishing to transfer between buses 
have to purchase a transfer, while transfer between rapid transit lines is free. 
Clearly, there is considerable evidence to suggest that the CTA ·should charge 
differential fares between bus and rail, especially in the off-peak. 
A striking feature is the oversupply of capacity in the peak. At the margin, 
the cost of providing peak service is very high. The peak period sets the_ standard 
for the number of vehicles required. Recent attempts by the CTA to stem its 
budget deficits have focussed on trimming off-peak service, yet peak service is 
the area where service decreases can lead to major cost reductions. Some people 
may argue that it is impossible to reduce peak service without leaving people 
behind at stops. While it is true that the CTA does operate at "crush loads" for 
short periods at certain parts of its system, it is likely that people will not be able 
to board the first bus or train that arrives if service is reduced. However, that 
situation does not occur on all parts of the CTA system. Even if one assumes that 
there are no riders traveling in the reverse direction to the peak flow, which is 
clearly not true, there is currently an average of 28 people on each bus and 70 
people per train car during the peak periods. 
In all time periods for both bus and rail service, there is clearly a greater 
benefit to subsidizing lower fares as opposed to increasing service levels. The 
current mix of fares to service levels is not at the social welfare optimum de-
scribed earlier in this paper. Even if subsidies are held constant, service levels 
should be cut across the board to finance lower fares. The causes for this imbal-
ance can be found by looking at the history of the CTA in the 10-year period 
1984-1994. Bus ridership fell by 31 percent and taiJ, ridership by 6 percent, yet 
vehicle miles and train miles did not change. Fares, on the other hand, increased 
by 14 percent in real terms. It is clear that the CTA has tried to maintain output in 
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the face of falling demand and has increased fares to correct any resulting budget 
deficit. Service cuts provok~~ry vocal opposition from staff and specific groups 
of riders. The opposition to f;re changes is a lot more defuse, and hence less 
politically effective. By ducking service cuts, the CTA has actually made the 
citizens of Chicago worse off rather than better off. 
Even knowledgeable observers of the industry frequently argue that transit 
should maintain service levels, even at the expense of higher fares:because tran-
sit demand is more responsive to frequency than it is to fares. That is certainly 
true, but demand is still inelastic with respe~t to frequency, and therefore ex-
panding service levels will lead to declining average load factors. This would not 
be a serious problem except that load factors in Chicago are already so low that 
the number of riders on the marginal vehicle are not sufficient o justify the cost 
of running it. In other words, while passengers are relatively sensitive to the level 
of service, the cost of providing any additional capacity is high. 
"Balancing" ofFares and Service Levels 
A decision on whether the current overall levels of subsidy to the CTA are 
justified can be made only after fares and service levels have been adjusted to 
efficiently use the existing subsidy. If one had the data to do so, one would pro-
ceed by balancing fares and service levels on each mode and in each time period 
independently. To do so, one would need to know the cross-elasticity effects 
between periods and modes. If bus fares are reduced by more than rail fares, 
what mode shift would occur? If peak service is reduced, what would be the 
effect on off-peak ridership? 
Unfortunately, such information is not readily available. We therefore pro-
ceeded to look at the policy option of changing fares and service levels by the 
same percentage for both modes in all time periods, so as not to change the rela-
tive value of the generalized cost of transit travel. Service levels were reduced, 
and then fares were reduced so as to keep producer surplus, i.e., subsidy, con-
stant. This was done until the combined consumer surplus from both the transit 
and road modes was maximized. At this point, fares and service levels are bal-
anced. The balance point required service levels to be reduced by 31 percent, and 
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the savings allow fares to be reduced by 59 percent. The change in the mix of 
fares and service levels to the balance point produced a gain in surplus of $76 
million a year, or about $15 per person in Cook County. On the average, peak 
load factors on both bus and rail come nowhere near capacity. However, it is 
likely that some traffic may be "choked off' at certain points in the system. In-
deed, it may be socially optimal for the CTA to not serve some peak demand 
when the costs of peak operation are considered. 
When fares and service levels were balanced, the benefit-cost ratio of in-
creasing the overall level of subsidy was calculated. This was found to be $1.16 
per $1 of subsidy. The return on transit subsidies is slightly less than the shadow 
value of sales taxes. The approximate nature of the model makes it difficult to 
conclude with certainty that subsidies are currently "too high." Certainly, one 
could not argue that subsidies are grossly wasteful. If fares and service levels 
were balanced in each time period and mode individually, it is likely that additional 
transit subsidies would be justified, particularly for bus service in the off-peak. 
Sensitivity to Cost Reductions 
In many parts of the world, competitive contracting, or outright private com-
petition, has been introduced into urban transit provision (Cox et al. 1995). A 
major objective has been to reduce unit cost levels that were believed to be too 
high under the.existing monopoly public provision. The CTA is a publicly-owned 
monopoly. Typically, cost reductions of 20 percent or more have been experi-
enced from competitive contracting. There is currently some discussion of intro-
ducing a limited experiment of competitive contracting in Chicago. The model 
was reestimated using unit cost reductions of 10 percent, 20 percent, and 30 
percent. Such reduction will affect only the returns to subsidizing level of ser-
vice, as it is assumed that fare reductions are costless. The benefit-cost ratios for 
various levels of cost reduction are shown in Table 7. 
It is clear, especially for off-peak bus service, that cost reduction would not 
only bring fares and service levels much more into balance but also make the 
case for additional subsidies much more clear cuf'\ ... 
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Table7 
Effect of Cost Reduction on Benefit per $1 of Subsidy for Increased Service Levels 
' 
,. 
BUS RAIL 
Peak Weekday Saturday Sunday Peak Weekday Saturday Sunday 
Off-Peak Off-Peak 
10% 0.23 1.32 1.47 1.37 0.38 1.09 0.87 0.60 
20% 0.27 1.61 1.82 1.68 0.43 1.26 1.00 0.69 
30% 0.31 2.07 2.39 2.17 0.49 1.48 1.17 0.80 
Policy Implications 
There are three major policy recommendations for the CTA. The first is to 
thoroughly investigate the cost effectiveness of the provision of additional peak 
capacity. The second is to consider a discounted fare on the buses during off-
peak hours. The third is to pursue policies to achieve unit cost reduction. If the 
CTA can make strides towards these three goals then it should not only be able to 
justify current subsidy levels, but also make a case for increased subsidies . 
Appendix: Calculation of Highway Peak Automobile Vehicle Miles 
No data exist that show the amount of traffic during the peak periods in 
Cook County. CATS includes a traffic demand model that can calculate vehicle 
miles on different links of the network for a 24-hour period on a summer week-
day (CATS 1996). CATS conducted a special run of its model to produce a ma-
trix of vehicle miles for Cook County broken divided three categories of roads: 
expressways, arterials, and collectors. Within each of those three categories, the 
data are separated into free-flow, moderate, and severe levels of congestion, based 
on the volume-to-capacity ratio of the link. While the model was run for the year 
2007, CATS scaling factors were used to produce mileage data for 1996. 
The problem was to determine the proportion of daily vehicle miles trav-
elled during the peak. This was relatively straightforward for the freeway system 
because the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) counts hourly on all 
Cook County freeways, using counting loops placed in the lanes. Data were ob-
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tained for six weekdays in March 1996 for 11 freeway locations, and the propor-
tion of traffic travelling in the peaks was estimated. 
Hourly data for non-freeway roads in Cook County is limited to vehicle 
counts by IDOT at selected intersections. The intersections are selected prima-
rily because IDOT is considering highway improvements at these locations. Counts 
are conducted over two midweek days between 6 a.m. and 6 p.m. Data are avail-
able for the hourly counts, and an estimate of the 24-hourvolume (average annu-
alized daily traffic, AADT). Peak percentage of daily traffic was calculated by 
dividing the sum of vehicles counted during the defined peak periods by the 
AADT. We then assigned each 
intersecti01;1 a road congestion 
designation of severe, moder-
ate, or free-flow, according to 
its peak volume-to-capacity ra-
tio. The capacity value is based 
upon the number of lanes, dis-
tribution of green time at an in-
tersection, and parking and 
other traffic restrictions. A typi-
cal intersection has a capacity 
Table Al 
Ratio of Peak to Daily Traffic 
Road Congestion Level 
Type 
Free-Flow Moderate Severe 
Freeway 43.7% (3) 4Q.7% (4) 35.5% (4) 
Arterial 44.1 % (31) · 42.2% (54) 43.5% (29) 
Collector 44.5% (50) 45.8% (21) 44.6% (15) 
of 700 vehicles per lane per hour. The Highway Capacity _Manual (TRB 1985) 
considers Class III Urban Streets, the type found in cities, to be severely con-
gested when the ratio is 1.00 or higher, and moderately congested when the ratio 
is between 0.63 and 1.00. Based on our classification of freeway locations and 
intersections by congestion level, we were able to determine the percentage of 
24-hour traffic that occurs during the peak. This is shown in the Table Al along 
with the number of sites in our sample in parentheses. ❖ 
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